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First Person Perspective of Seated 
Participants Over a Walking Virtual 
Body Leads to Illusory Agency Over 
the Walking
Elena Kokkinara1,†, Konstantina Kilteni1,‡, Kristopher J. Blom1 & Mel Slater1,2,3
Agency, the attribution of authorship to an action of our body, requires the intention to carry out the 
action, and subsequently a match between its predicted and actual sensory consequences. However, 
illusory agency can be generated through priming of the action together with perception of bodily 
action, even when there has been no actual corresponding action. Here we show that participants can 
have the illusion of agency over the walking of a virtual body even though in reality they are seated and 
only allowed head movements. The experiment (n = 28) had two factors: Perspective (1PP or 3PP) and 
Head Sway (Sway or NoSway). Participants in 1PP saw a life-sized virtual body spatially coincident with 
their own from a first person perspective, or the virtual body from third person perspective (3PP). In 
the Sway condition the viewpoint included a walking animation, but not in NoSway. The results show 
strong illusions of body ownership, agency and walking, in the 1PP compared to the 3PP condition, and 
an enhanced level of arousal while the walking was up a virtual hill. Sway reduced the level of agency. 
We conclude with a discussion of the results in the light of current theories of agency.
Normally humans are able to trivially distinguish their own actions from those of other people; we know we are 
the cause of our own volitional actions and take responsibility for the effects. This sensation of agency allows us to 
distinguish self-generated actions from those of others, contributing to bodily self-consciousness1,2. But how do 
we know that we ourselves produced a given action? In the study reported in this paper we show that it is possible 
to alter the perception of our actions, and create the illusory perception of carrying out an action (walking) while 
in fact seated.
Most theories of agency suggest that the brain predicts the sensory consequences of an action through an 
efference copy that takes as input the motor commands, and then compares predictions with the perceived out-
comes. Hence, matches between the predicted sensory feedback (i.e. on the basis of the motor signals) and the 
sensory reafferences provide a sense of control over those actions – see the review by David, et al.3 and the earlier 
work by Holst and Mittelstaedt4, Sperry5, Blakemore, et al.6, Blakemore, et al.7 and Frith8. However, it seems that 
the comparisons of efferent and afferent signals alone cannot completely explain certain aspects of agency3,9–11. 
Some amputees express a feeling of agency towards a moving hand that is reflected in a mirror, seen in a location 
where their amputated arm would be reflected12. As another example of false attribution of agency Wegner, et al.13  
described an experiment where participants looked at themselves in a mirror, but where the arms of the exper-
imenter were arranged so that it could seem as if they were the arms of the participants. Participants tended to 
attribute a degree of authorship of the arm movements of the experimenter to themselves when there had been 
a prior instruction to carry out the movement, showing that priming can affect the sense of agency, even in the 
absence of self-executed movements.
In a recent between-groups study by Banakou and Slater14 immersive virtual reality (IVR) was used to embody 
participants in a life-sized virtual body using a head-tracked, stereo head-mounted display (HMD). The body 
was seen from first person perspective (1PP) as spatially coincident with and substituting their own real body. 
1Event Lab, Departament de Psicologia Clínica i Psicobiologia Faculty of Psychology, University of Barcelona, Spain. 
2Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats – ICREA, Spain. 3Department of Computer Science, University 
College London, UK. †Present address: Brain, Body and Self Laboratory, Department of Neuroscience, Karolinska, 
Stockholm, Sweden. ‡Present address: GV2 lab, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland. Correspondence and requests 
for materials should be addressed to M.S. (email: melslater@ub.edu)
Received: 13 July 2015
Accepted: 08 June 2016
Published: 01 July 2016
OPEN
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
2Scientific RepoRts | 6:28879 | DOI: 10.1038/srep28879
Real-time motion capture was employed to make the virtual body move synchronously with and corresponding 
to real body movements (visuomotor synchrony), or for another group of participants the body moved inde-
pendently of real movements (visuomotor asynchrony). They saw their virtual body both by directly looking 
down towards their real body, and also reflected in a mirror. At some point the virtual body spontaneously spoke 
some words in a voice that had a higher fundamental frequency than the voices of the participants. Those in the 
visuomotor synchronous condition overall reported a greater sense of agency over the speaking than those in the 
asynchronous condition. Moreover, when after the experiment participants were later asked to speak, the funda-
mental frequency of their voices tended to move towards the (higher) pitch of the virtual body’s voice amongst 
those in the synchronous condition only. Since visuomotor synchrony was associated with much greater levels of 
subjective body ownership over the virtual body, the illusory perception that the virtual body was their own, it 
was concluded that such illusory agency could result from body ownership. In other words participants have the 
illusion that since the virtual body is perceptually experienced as their own, and since that body is speaking, then 
it must have been the participants who were speaking (since under conditions of normal health we never have the 
illusion that we are the authors of someone else’s utterances).
Finally, in another recent study using IVR by Tieri, et al.15 participants were embodied in a virtual body and 
passively observed the movements of a virtual limb that was either partially occluded or disconnected from the 
hand. Body ownership and vicarious agency were both decreased by visual discontinuity suggesting that visual 
continuity of the body limbs with the body is important for the false (vicarious) attribution of agency in the 
absence of real movements.
In the present study we explored how perspective view can influence illusory agency in a different domain – 
showing that participants can have the illusion of walking, when in fact they are seated and immobile (apart from 
head movements) in a fixed chair. Locomotion, such as walking, and movements of single body parts (i.e. upper 
limbs or the act of speaking) are different with respect to the sensorimotor mechanisms that are involved. While 
walking we generate bilateral cyclic movements, and although we usually initiate a gait cycle in order to reach 
a goal, the actual leg movements are considered highly automatic and rarely immediately goal-directed16,17, as 
opposed to leg movements like kicking or jumping. An additional difference between locomotion and body-part 
movement, is that locomotion also triggers internal sensory systems, such as vestibular sensations, as well as 
a perception of visual changes (optic flow) in the surrounding extrapersonal space - see the review by Patla18. 
Recent studies have suggested that when the viewpoint of a participant in IVR oscillates to generate the optic flow 
that would be produced by a real walk, the sensation of walking might improve19,20.
Visual feedback of a walking body that represents the participant can also produce an illusory agency effect, 
without the feedback from the optic flow from the surrounding environment. For example, Moseley21 and Soler, 
et al.22 tested the analgesic effect of virtual walking (by using a screen that shows a lower body walking connected 
with a mirror showing the real upper body moving) on paraplegic patients with neuropathic pain due to spinal 
cord injury. Although the overall ratings of the illusion of walking were not very high, the fact that there was a 
decrease of neuropathic pain after exposure to virtual walking suggests that the visual feedback of the walking 
motions may have been effective in correcting a mismatch between motor output and sensory feedback.
In order to test the effects of perspective and body ownership on the feeling of agency over walking move-
ments, we immersed participants in a virtual environment, where a virtual body, seen either as spatially coin-
cident with the real body and from a first person perspective (1PP) or separate from the viewpoint of the real 
body from third person perspective (3PP), was walking forward across a field (Fig. 1). Moreover, in order to 
test the importance of the optic flow, a second factor was whether a sway animation was applied or not to their 
viewpoint. This sway was based on a pre-recorded animation of real walking. In other words there was a sway 
applied to the head as one factor (Head Sway) that had two levels Sway or NoSway. The experiment is illustrated 
in Supplementary Video S1 which shows the Sway condition, and Supplementary Video S2 which shows the 
NoSway.
We expected a stronger sensation of body ownership and of illusory agency towards the walking movements 
in the 1PP. Although we expected a greater feeling of walking due to the sway movement19,20, we did not have a 
prediction one way or the other about its effect on agency. We evaluated body ownership and agency over the 
illusory walking with a questionnaire and with physiological responses to walking up a hill during the walking 
experience in the virtual environment. Previously physiological responses have been correlated with subjective 
body ownership in response to a threat23–28. However, in our case, we were interested in physiological response to 
preparation for a physical effort that is required to climb up a hill, since previous studies in motor imagery have 
shown that physiological reactions can increase during mental effort due imaginary walking or running29. Hence, 
for this study, we hypothesized that the reaction would be stronger when participants feel illusory agency and 
ownership towards the walking body than when this does not occur.
Results
Questionnaire scores. The questionnaire is shown in Table 1 (see also Methods) with results in Fig. 2, 
grouped by a categorisation related to ownership, agency, the experience of movement, and state. Examining 
Fig. 2A it is clear that 1PP resulted in greater scores than 3PP for the sensation of location at the virtual body and 
the illusion of body ownership, whereas with respect to the feeling that the body was that of someone else the 
scores are reversed (higher for 3PP). It is also clear that if the Sway Animation factor had any effect at all it was 
in the case of 3PP only (for Located and OtherBody). We use mixed effects logistic regression (Stata 14 function 
‘meologit’) with random effects over the individuals, and with robust standard errors (to take account of possible 
violations of the model assumptions). For each variable, we first fitted the full model (Perspective and Sway as 
main effects with interaction). If the interaction effect was not significant at 5% the model was fitted with main 
effects only, and any main effects that were not significant were removed and the model was refitted if anything 
significant remained. The results are shown in Table 2, and confirm what can be seen in Fig. 2. For the questions 
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related to the illusion of ownership (Located, Ownership) 1PP perspective results in higher scores than 3PP per-
spective, whereas OtherBody has lower scores for 1PP.
Figure 1. Illusory Walking setup. (A) Participants were seated still on a stool, except for head movements.  
(B) Initially participants saw the standing virtual body reflected in a mirror (1PP condition). (C) Participants 
saw the walking virtual body from 1PP, or (D) from 3PP. The walking body always cast a shadow.
Question Statement
Located During the experiment I felt as if my body was located where I saw the virtual body to be.
Ownership During the experiment I felt that the virtual body was my own body.
Standing During the experiment I felt that I was standing upright.
MyMovements
During the experiment I felt that the leg 
movements of the virtual body were my 
movements.
Agency
During the experiment I felt that the leg 
movements of the virtual body were caused by 
my movements.
OtherBody During the experiment I felt that the virtual body belonged to someone else.
Effort I felt I had to give extra physical effort when I reached the hill.
Vection I felt that I was moving through space rather than the world moving past me.
Walking I felt that I was walking.
Dragged I felt that I was being dragged.
Sliding I felt that I was sliding.
Table 1.  The post-experience questionnaire. All questions were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (totally disagree) 
to 7 (totally agree).
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The 1PP condition results in higher reported Agency which is reduced in the case of Sway (Fig. 2B). Walking is 
slightly more complex in interpretation because the interaction term is significant. In 1PP the illusion of walking 
is high irrespective of Sway, but in 3PP it is lower for NoSway. This also distinguishes Walking from Agency – the 
first of course concerned with the illusion of walking, but the second with authorship over the walking. Note that 
the overall goodness of fit of each model is very good, as shown by the Wald χ 2 values in Table 2.
Physiological Responses. Participants experienced the walking for 4 minutes. For the first three minutes 
the walking was over level ground, but then continued up a hill for 44 s. We predicted that agency over the walk-
ing would result in heightened physiological responses during the hill climbing period compared to a baseline 
period that started 90 s before the hill climbing and lasted for as long (44 s). We recorded skin conductance, elec-
trocardiogram (ECG) and respiration (see Methods). Physiological data from one participant (belonging to the 
Sway condition) were not available due to a failure in recording. A number of individual time series are shown in 
Supplementary Figs S1–S16.
To compare the responses across the conditions, we used as a response variable the differences between the 
mean skin conductance amplitudes in the hill-climbing period and the baseline (dSC = mean (Hill Climbing) 
− mean (Baseline)) (see Methods - Response Variables).
A mixed effects ANOVA for dSC on Perspective and Sway and their interaction found no effect for the inter-
action or Sway terms (P = 0.87 and 0.96, respectively) but for Perspective P = 0.025. The result for Sway does not 
Figure 2. Box plots of the questionnaire results. (A) The body ownership questions. (B) Related to agency.  
(C) Related to experience of movement. (D) Related to state - walking and effort.
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change when the interaction is removed, and Perspective has P = 0.005 when Sway is also removed. The coeffi-
cient for Perspective (3PP = 0, 1PP = 1) is 0.28 ± 0.10 (SE), with 95% confidence interval 0.08 to 0.48. This reflects 
what can be seen in Table 3: that 1PP resulted in greater change in SC than 3PP, but that there are no other effects.
For the heart rate (HR) data the response variable is the change from the mean instantaneous HR during the 
baseline period and the mean instantaneous HR during the hill climbing (dHR). Table 4 shows a likely effect 
of perspective, but no interaction effect or main effect of Sway. The mixed effects regression confirms that nei-
ther interaction (P = 0.43) nor Sway (after removal of interaction P = 0.73) approach significance. However, 
Perspective by itself has coefficient 1.6 ± 0.83, P = 0.06, with 95% confidence interval −0.08 to 3.17.
Similarly for the respiration we use the change from the baseline to the hill climbing period with respect to the 
number of breaths per minute (dResp) with results shown in Table 5. There are no significant effects.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the subjective Ownership and the physiological responses. For skin 
conductance dSC (Fig. 3A) there is no relationship. In the case of dHR (Fig. 3B) it appears that greater Ownership 
is associated with greater change in HR but only in the 1PP condition. In fact in the mixed effects regression the 
interaction term has P = 0.06, providing some evidence in support of what the graph suggests. It should be noted 
that there are several potential outliers in the 3PP case which influence the overall fit. Considering only the 1PP 
Question
Perspective 
(3PP = 0, 1PP = 1)
Sway Animation 
(NoSway = 0, Sway = 1) Interaction
Wald 
χ2 d.f. Overall P
Located 3.6 ± 0.85 (0.000) 17.83 1 0.0000
Ownership 2.4 ± 0.63 (0.000) 14.37 1 0.0000
Standing –
MyMovements 4.1 ± 0.57 (0.000) 50.1 1 0.0000
Agency 4.4 ± 0.73 (0.000) − 3.2 ± 1.45 (0.028) 37.98 2 0.0000
OtherBody − 1.9 ± 0.59 (0.002) 9.86 1 0.0017
Effort –
Vection –
Walking 2.5 ± 0.59 (0.000) 1.9 ± 1.10 (0.087) − 2.7 ± 1.00 (0.006) 18.20 3 0.0004
Dragged –
Sliding –
Table 2.  Mixed effects logistic regression of the questionnaire responses. The entries are coefficient 
estimate ± S.E. of the corresponding effect in the linear predictor (with the significance level in brackets). 0.000 
means P < 0.0005, and 0.0000 means P < 0.00005. The – symbol indicates no significance.
NoSway Sway Overall Mean
3PP 0.28 ± 0.20 0.29 ± 0.16 0.29 ± 0.13
1PP 0.58 ± 0.21 0.60 ± 0.16 0.59 ± 0.13
Overall Mean 0.43 ± 0.15 0.45 ± 0.12 0.44 ± 0.09
Table 3.  Means and SEs of change in skin conductance (microsiemens) from baseline to hill climbing 
(dSC).
NoSway Sway Overall Mean
3PP − 0.55 ± 0.74 0.39 ± 0.69 − 0.10 ± 0.51
1PP 1.62 ± 0.91 1.28 ± 0.97 1.45 ± 0.65
Overall Mean 0.54 ± 0.61 0.85 ± 0.60 0.69 ± 0.42
Table 4.  Means and SEs of change in instantaneous HR (beats per minute) change from the baseline to the 
hill climbing.
NoSway Sway Grand Mean
3PP − 0.19 ± 0.50 0.67 ± 0.92 − 0.22 ± 0.51
1PP − 0.13 ± 0.81 − 0.70 ± 0.78 − 0.42 ± 0.77
Grand Mean − 0.16 ± 0.47 − 0.04 ± 0.60 − 0.10 ± 0.38
Table 5.  Means and SEs of change in respiration rate (dResp) from the baseline to the hill climbing.
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case then the Spearman correlation is ρ = 0.49, P = 0.009 (n = 27). There is no significant relationship for respi-
ration (dResp).
It might be thought that since each participant had the experience twice (1PP and 3PP, counterbalanced) that 
the second time there would be foreknowledge about the hill climbing that could have influenced the physiolog-
ical responses. This is unlikely to be the case because of the counterbalanced design. However, including order in 
the fitted models discussed above shows no impact at all of this factor.
Discussion
Previous studies have suggested that the subjective experience of agency is based on the match between the 
predicted or the intended outcome and the perceived outcome of an action4–9,30. Typically agency, therefore, 
is assessed with respect to actual action, although, there is some evidence that illusory agency can occur in 
healthy participants, since actions can be attributed to the self without being executed, but just observed14,29,31,32. 
Moreover, recent evidence has suggested that 1PP with visuomotor synchrony between real and virtual body 
movements plays an important role in facilitating illusory agency14. Our results extend these findings, showing 
that even while participants are seated in a chair and not walking, seeing the virtual body from a first person per-
spective when it is walking can result in high levels of body ownership and self-attribution of the walking action. 
This is supported by both subjective and physiological responses.
Vection (optic flow indicating forward movement) was present in all conditions33, and correspondingly it 
was subjectively reported as being approximately the same on the average in all conditions (Fig. 2). This serves 
Figure 3. Scatter diagrams of change in physiological responses from baseline to hill climbing by Ownership. 
(A) For skin conductance (dSC), (B) for heart rate (dHR) and (C) for respiration (dResp).
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to validate the setup. Moreover, manipulations of the head sway to simulate walking negatively influenced the 
sense of agency, though at the same time enhanced the feeling of walking, in the 3PP condition. We examine these 
results considering the current theories of agency and focus on the apparent influence of seeing the animated 
virtual body from 1PP.
Although the sense of agency has been suggested to principally arise due to internal motor signals while 
generating a movement (internal forward models)30,34, recent studies have investigated the role of intention, sug-
gesting that the sense of agency might also be affected by external cues that are responsible for the selection of 
an action - see the review by Chambon, et al.9. In other words, intentions prior to action might play a significant 
role in action attribution, when reafferent (visual, motor, or proprioceptive) signals become available and match 
with intentions in a retrospective way35, or even prior to action execution in a prospective way36,37. Moreover, the 
close match between prior intentions and subsequent action might create feelings of agency even in the absence 
of efferent signals (i.e. after involuntary movements)38, or even in the complete absence of movements13. Moore, 
et al.38 further found that in the case of involuntary movements, external cues from intention priming sufficiently 
close in time to the action (1 s before the movement) play a greater role in affecting judgements of agency, than in 
voluntary movements. Although explicit priming was not part of our study, it is possible that an intention to walk 
might have been created, a few moments after the virtual body started moving, and it follows that since walking 
is a highly trained motor behaviour, there could be a preparation of the motor commands that would normally 
be generated in order to walk towards a destination. This intention to walk could have prospectively enhanced 
the feeling of agency towards the seen walking movements, in a similar way as reported in the study of Wegner, 
et al.13. Moreover, since there were no efferent signals, intention might have been an even more effective cue for 
agency38.
This is similar to the argument by Banakou and Slater14 accounting for the finding that subsequent participant 
speech had its frequency shifted towards that of the virtual body only under the 1PP condition with visuomotor 
synchrony. It was argued that the strong body ownership associated with that condition led to motor planning 
for subsequent action of the same type (talking) and the same properties (walking). However, a subsequent study 
using the same equipment and 1PP setup, but where ownership over the virtual body was induced by visuotactile 
stimulation rather than visuomotor, also resulted in a high level of subjective agency over the talking, but did 
not result in a shift of fundamental frequency towards that of the voice of the virtual body. Hence it appears that 
1PP induced body ownership alone cannot account for these results but rather they could be accounted for as a 
generalisation of agency from the act of moving (true agency over the movements of the virtual body) to the act 
of talking (illusory agency over the virtual body talking), but with 1PP as a necessary requirement.
In the case of the current experiment we found agency over the walking in the 1PP condition, but not in the 
3PP, compatible with the results of Banakou and Slater14. There is some evidence of physiological changes in 
skin conductance and heart rate due to going up the hill, and some evidence that the HR change correlates with 
subjective body ownership, but further study is needed on this aspect. We may have found more convincing phys-
iological results had participants initially had a period of visuomotor synchrony - i.e., where they moved and saw 
the virtual body move synchronously and correspondingly.
However, this discussion also highlights an important difference from the setup of Banakou and Slater14 since 
from the outset participants saw their virtual body doing something that they were definitely not doing, whereas 
in the earlier study the talking occurred only after several minutes into the experiment. Agency only on the basis 
of 1PP is unlikely. This might be explained by the work of Patla and colleagues who explored the importance of 
vision of the body while walking18,39. According to their results, viewing the limb position and movement plays 
an important role in planning and regulating the swing limb trajectory. Given this notion, it is possible that when 
the legs of the collocated virtual body (1PP) were observed while walking forward, an action representation for 
the planning of the next movement might have been initiated. Actually this is not surprising at all, since in our 
whole life when we look down and see our legs walking, we are walking. Hence, it is possible that a combination 
of the seeing the walking legs plus possible intention created by the walking experience contributed to the illusory 
agency. Further studies will need to carefully investigate this possibility and the relative importance of the two.
The role of visual information over proprioception on the feeling of false agency attribution has been also dis-
cussed in the past. Viewing one hand moving in a mirror, in a setup that gave the illusion that the opposite hand 
was moving, generated cortical motor activity related to the non-moving hand40 and vicarious agency seems to 
occur in view of an anatomically plausible structure and position of a moving arm13,15. Nevertheless, we should 
not disregard the influence of proprioception on body and movement perception. Goodwin, et al.41 and oth-
ers42–44 have shown that directly changing proprioceptive signals through the application of vibratory stimuli to 
the arm’s muscles can produce illusions of movement. See the review by Proske and Gandevia45 on the relation of 
proprioception and movement perception.
Our results demonstrate the perceived sense of control over the walking movements, using explicit judgement 
of agency, but also there is some evidence for physiological measures - see Synofzik, et al.10 for a discussion of 
explicit judgements and unconscious internal feeling of agency. Although physiological responses have been 
correlated with subjective body ownership in response to a threat23–26,46,47, especially when the body is seen from 
1PP25,26,47, the stimuli in our case was designed to reflect the effort of hill climbing. Results indicate a possible 
greater reaction to climbing the hill when the body is perceived from a 1PP. This could be related to results from 
studies in motor imagery, where participants imagine themselves performing a movement (from 1PP), without 
moving the body parts involved. Decety, et al.48 found that physiological reactions during mental effort increased, 
suggesting that the central programming structures might anticipate the need for energetic mobilization, when 
planning a movement. We argue that this could have been the case for observing (instead of imagining) from a 
1PP and potentially planning the walking movements.
It is possible that our results are tied to the specific task. Walking is a special type of action that involves the 
entire body and it is characterized by rhythmic, alternating movement of the limbs, while walking patterns appear 
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to be innate16 (for a review see Rosenbaum49, Chapter 5). Moreover, rhythmic activity of the leg muscles has been 
shown to occur in cats with disconnected spinal cord from the brain or when sensory feedback was prevented, 
implying that the brain is not vital for generating basic walking patterns, while there are similar but indirect 
observations for humans (for a review, see Dietz50). We predict, following Wegner, et al.13, that if participants were 
presented with a random or less automated action instead of walking, it would not have been possible to attribute 
the observed movements, at least without explicitly priming the intention before the seen action. This is an issue 
for further study.
A further hint about the role of embodiment on walking perception comes from a recent study by Leonardis, 
et al.51. Here vestibular, proprioceptive and visual stimuli were provided to participants who were not executing 
any movements, in order to simulate walking movements through a walking virtual body. Compared to visual 
stimulation only (without vestibular and proprioceptive stimulation) participants reported a greater feeling of 
walking and exhibited increased mean skin conductance responses and respiration rate. Although the authors 
relate these results to embodiment (using a combination of questions related to factors such as body ownership 
and sense of agency), there was no direct evidence of the establishment of the body ownership illusion (i.e. the 
questionnaire scores were low), and they did not discuss their results in relation to agency. However, their results 
provide another indication that illusory walking can occur through embodiment in VR, without the need for 
actual action execution.
Results from the reported feeling of walking are inline with the results from the work of Lécuyer, et al.19 and 
Terziman, et al.20 Our participants reported a greater feeling of walking in the swaying condition (only when in 
3PP), as in those previous studies, where there was no body representation. However, it seems that the effect of 
the swaying camera is overridden when there is embodiment.
With respect to the influence of embodiment on the experience of agency this was considered by Caspar, 
et al.52. They suggested that visual incongruence of finger movements of an embodied robotic hand (the robot 
moves a different finger than the one that the participant moves) does not entirely abolish the sense of being the 
agent of an action, although it is known that a passive movements condition does abolish agency. Hence, they 
concluded that information from incongruent versus congruent embodiment can partially contribute to the expe-
rience of agency.
It is also important to explain at this point, the interesting result that body ownership was induced at all, using 
our setup. It is known that congruent combinations of sensory input from vision, touch, motor control and pro-
prioception are some of the key mechanisms to body perception (for a review see53–55). Most studies specifically 
suggest that incongruent visuomotor stimulation can significantly diminish56–59, or break the illusion of owner-
ship60. Thus, one would expect that since the participants did not produce any movements except head move-
ments, it would not be possible to feel ownership towards the walking virtual body. However, recent evidence 
suggests that when the ownership illusion is strong, incongruent cues are not experienced as incorrect47, and for 
some cases this seems to be true (up to a point) even in the complete absence of motor execution15. 1PP seems to 
clearly dominate as an explanatory factor for subjective and physiological measures of ownership46, while con-
gruent head movements are also essential when other cues are not so dominant26,47. It seems possible that these 
two cues alone could override incongruent visuomotor stimulation of body parts when there is visual continuity 
of the body15 and our results suggest that this could also be possible in the case of walking.
Methods
Experimental Design. Twenty eight participants (20 female; mean age 23 ± 3.5 years) were recruited by 
advertisement around the University campus. The experiment was approved by the Comissio Bioética of the 
University of Barcelona and carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines. All participants gave written 
informed consent and were paid 5 euros for their participation.
The experiment had a 2 × 2 mixed effects design with one between factor (Head Sways) that had two levels 
(NoSway and Sway) and one within factor (Perspective Position) with two levels - third person perspective (3PP) 
and first person perspective (1PP). In other words, participants were in two groups where one group experienced 
the walking experiment with Sway and the other group with NoSway. The order of the within factor was coun-
terbalanced across the participants within each group. In the 1PP condition participants saw a life-sized virtual 
body spatially coincident with their own (obscured) body, and seen from a first person perspective as if from the 
eyes of that body. In the 3PP participants saw the same virtual body but outside of and slightly in front and to the 
left of themselves.
Seated participants donned a head-tracked HMD (Fig. 1A), so that their view was always updated as a func-
tion of their head orientation. In the Sway condition their view was further modulated by a walking animation 
as applied to the head (in other words swaying slightly from side to side and up and down). After participants 
were immersed in the virtual world, their point of view moved forward with a spatially coincident (1PP) or a 
non-spatially coincident (3PP) walking virtual body (Fig. 1C,D). By spatially coincident we mean that the virtual 
body visually substituted the person’s real body, albeit the virtual body was standing while the real body was 
seated. Depending on the Sway Animation condition, their point of view would additionally follow the walking 
oscillations, following the pre-recorded walking animation (Sway), or just following the main axis of the forward 
movement without any oscillations (NoSway). It could be expected that the foreign walking and swaying move-
ments would produce additional motion sickness. A few participants reported mild nausea (but not severe), 
which is not unusual for many VR applications that involved movement through a space.
Materials. Participants were immersed in the virtual reality scenario by fitting them with a stereo NVIS nVisor 
SX111 HMD. This has dual SXGA displays with 76° Hx64° V field of view per eye, with 50° (66%) of overlap, 
totalling a wide field of view of 102° horizontal and 64° vertical, with a resolution of 1280 × 1024 per eye displayed 
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at 60 Hz. Head tracking was performed by a 6-degrees of freedom Intersense IS-900 device. Audio feedback was 
provided through headphones to further isolate participants from sounds from the laboratory.
The virtual environment was implemented using the Unity3D platform. The virtual model of the room was 
designed in 3D Studio Max 2010, and we used animation-enabled models of male and female virtual bodies 
purchased from Rocketbox Studios. The walking animation for the virtual body was recorded using an Optitrack 
Motion Capture system, and manually refined using Autodesk Motion Builder 2012 software.
Physiological (electrocardiogram (ECG), skin conductance and respiration) signals were recorded at a sam-
pling rate of 256 Hz, using the g.tec bio-signal acquisition device g.USBamp, while recordings and storage of the 
data were handled by a Simulink model in Matlab. All statistical analysis was carried out with Stata 14.
Procedures. Preparation. The participant was seated on a stool in the VR lab (Fig. 1A). Participants were 
told that they would be immersed in a virtual environment and that they would see a virtual body, without speci-
fying whether the body would be seen from a 1PP or a 3PP. They were also told that this body would start moving 
forward, without specifying that the body would perform walking movements. After the experimenter verbally 
gave the instructions and attached the sensors for recording the physiological signals, the participants donned the 
HMD and headphones and they were immersed in the virtual environment, providing them 1PP or 3PP view of a 
gender-matched virtual body that was in a standing position. The HMD was calibrated for each participant using 
the method described in ref. 61.
The displayed scene was initially the inside of a wooden cabin from which a mountain landscape could be seen 
through the windows and the open door (Supplementary Video S1). There was also an ambient sound of birds 
appropriate for the environment, which served to isolate participants from any lab sounds. Participants were first 
instructed to describe the virtual world, in order to familiarize themselves with the environment and with the 
virtual body, which could also be seen as a reflection in a virtual mirror (Fig. 1B). They were also instructed not 
to move any part of their body except for their head, throughout the experiment.
Walking Phase. After the familiarization phase, the virtual body started walking forward, towards the moun-
tain landscape, outside the wooden cabin. The virtual body walked for 4 minutes at a constant pace, using a 
pre-recorded animation applied to the entire body, excluding the arms. Each complete walk cycle would last 
1.267 s, which resulting in a constant velocity of 1 m/s. The viewpoint of the participants followed the virtual body 
at the same speed, so as to be always seeing the body from 1PP (from a position corresponding to the eyes of the 
virtual body) (Fig. 1C) or from a constant distance of 20 cm to front and 100 cm to the left (3PP) of the virtual 
body (Fig. 1D). We chose this as a distinguishable distance between participant’s viewpoint and the virtual body 
location. In the case of the NoSway condition, the viewpoint corresponded to that based on the head tracker 
for orientation and followed the virtual body’s forward movements for position. However, in the case of Sway a 
further animation was applied to the viewpoint, simulating a head sway corresponding to a walking motion. This 
was accomplished by allowing the viewpoint to follow the oscillations of the virtual body’s head produced by the 
pre-recorded walking animation.
In order to control for the amount of time that each participant was looking towards the body and specifically 
towards the walking legs, virtual balls appeared at random points 12 times along the walking path. Each ball 
appeared 6 meters in front of walking body and participants were instructed to look towards the virtual legs for 
a few seconds every time they would see one of the balls. These were either the legs seen from the 1PP body or 
from the 3PP body. However, as in any experiment where the participants’ eyes are not visible to the experimenter 
and not eye-tracked, it is not possible know the exact time that participants spent looking at the stimuli, nor how 
much this varied across participants.
On the third minute of the virtual walk, the virtual body approached and started climbing a 32 m long hill with 
20° of inclination, using the same walking animation. The hill climbing lasted 44 s. We assumed that this would be 
perceived as a demanding walking task and we expected physiological responses to this activity. The walk contin-
ued for another 21.5 m until a stop sign was reached, at which moment the experiment was concluded.
The task was repeated twice; once for the 1PP and once for the 3PP condition, with a 5 min break between 
where participants completed a questionnaire. After the second repetition they completed an identical question-
naire, were briefed about the purpose of the experiment and were compensated for the participation.
Response Variables. Questionnaire. After each Perspective trial (1PP, 3PP), a questionnaire was given to 
the participant. This was designed to assess the level and quality of (a) the body ownership illusion experienced 
by the participants, derived from62, and (b) the level of the experienced feeling of walking and agency over the 
walking movements. Participants were asked to rate 11 statements appearing in a different random order for each 
participant (Table 1).
The first question (Located) referred to self-localization. Ownership is concerned with the subjective strength 
of the ownership illusion whereas Otherbody is a corresponding control question. Standing assessed the feeling 
of standing (instead of seating on a chair). MyMovements was concerned with the sense of ownership of the 
movement, whereas Agency was concerned with the sense of motor control63. Effort assessed the feeling of extra 
effort when going up the hill. The remaining questions concerned the feeling of moving: Vection moving in space; 
Walking the feeling of walking; Dragged the feeling of being dragged, and Sliding the feeling of sliding. Dragged 
and Sliding were exploratory items in order to understand participants’ perception of the walking movements (i.e. 
more passive or active).
Physiological Responses. Physiological activity during mental effort in motor imagery studies has been shown to 
increase beyond the level of metabolic demands of a static body, suggesting that the central programming struc-
tures might anticipate the need for energetic mobilization, when planning a movement48. We hypothesized that if 
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agency would occur during the virtual walking, then participants would react physiologically to the demanding 
task of walking uphill. We recorded skin conductance, ECG and respiration throughout the experiment. Our 
purpose was also to find out whether these were influenced by the different experimental conditions. Heart rate 
(HR) and respiration rate (RR) were calculated as the mean instantaneous HR or RR (reciprocals of the HR or 
RR intervals) during two periods: the stimulation period (climbing the hill) and a baseline period. We chose the 
baseline period to start 90 s before reaching the hill, because we assumed that there would be no physiological 
reactions from changes in the environment from that moment. Since the overall time to climb the hill was 44 s, the 
time duration of both stimulation and baseline periods was 44 s. Similarly we calculated the maximum amplitude 
of skin conductance levels during the same baseline and stimulation period.
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